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"The conventional wisdom is often wrong."' -Steven D. Levitt
I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry wrote a
scathing argument in Foreign Policy decrying Syrian President Bashar
2
al-Assad's use of starvation as a weapon of war.
* Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, May 2015. Bachelor of Arts in
Reconciliation Studies, Bethel University, December 2011. 1 would like to thank my friends and
family for their edits and their support during law school. Particularly, I would like to thank Steve
Wolfe, Teresa Wolfe, Nate Wolfe, Jamie Wolfe, Idona Wolfe, Micah Duke, Katie Cherrier, and
Lynn Cherrier for their help during my writing process.
1.

STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER,

FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST

EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 13 (2005).

2.

John F. Kerry, Assad's War of Starvation,FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 25 2013).
1
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The world already knows that Bashar al-Assad has used chemical
weapons, indiscriminate bombing, arbitrary detentions, rape, and
torture against his own citizens. What is far less well known, and
equally intolerable,is the systematic denial of medical assistance,
food supplies, and other humanitarian aid to huge portions of the
population. This denial of the most basic human rights must
end. . .. '
Secretary Kerry equated the deprivation of medical assistance, food,
and humanitarian aid to the use of chemical weapons and other forms of
horrendous violence. The United States frequently places economic
sanctions on other countries that result in the denial of these necessities
to the public of targeted states.4 The United States and its allies impose
economic sanctions on a regular basis, often simply as an expression of5
disapproval and with little investigation into the ultimate effects.
Policymakers must recognize that further use of economic sanctions is
not worth the public costs to the United States or targeted nations.
Scholars vigorously debate the merits of economic sanctions. Many
argue that sanctions rarely achieve their objectives, and they frequently
violate the public's human rights in targeted states. 6 Conversely, many
hail economic sanctions as an important nonviolent tool for coercing and
persuading change. 7 Sanctions also allow politicians to signal official
displeasure and the appearance of productivity. 8 Politicians primarily
focus on the immediate domestic effects, and enact sanctions without a
thorough understanding of the long-term effects on the American
economy and the public within a targeted nation. 9 In November 2013, the
Islamic Republic of Iran l ° negotiated a temporary agreement with major
world powers (known as the P5+1)"' regarding Iran's nuclear program. 12
The media and many American politicians have frequently and
3.

Id. (emphasis added).

4. See infra Part II.B.
5. Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions: The Bottom Line,
89 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 337, 338 (1995).
6. Amy Howlett, Getting "Smart": CraftingEconomicSanctions thatRespect All Human
Rights, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1216-20 (2004).
7. Id. at 1220-21.
8. Barry E. Carter, InternationalEconomic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S.
Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1248 (1987).

9. Id.
10. Hereinafter "Iran."
11. This group is made up of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany. This group of
nations is also known as the E3+3.
12.

IranNuclear Deal: Joint Plan ofAction - Full Document, GUARMAN (Nov. 24,2013),

http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-deal-joint-plan-action
[hereinafter Interim Agreement].
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incorrectly attributed Iran's willingness to negotiate to the effectiveness
of the economic sanctions imposed on Iran.13
The purpose of this Article is to convince policymakers that the
achievement of an interim nuclear agreement with Iran should not be seen
as a mandate on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, and that further
use of economic sanctions is not worth the public costs to targeted nations
or the United States. First, this Article will explain the basic uses and
legal provisions for economic sanctions. Second, this Article will detail
the public costs that economic sanctions can inflict on the United States
and on the nations it targets. Lastly, this Article will explain the interim
nuclear agreement with Iran, and why the apparent success of the
economic sanctions imposed on Iran do not justify the continued use of
economic sanctions.
II. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Economic sanctions are "coercive measure[s] taken by one or more
countries toward another to force it to comply with international law.' ' 14
The term "sanctions" can refer to both economic and military measures,
but for the purposes of this Article, it will only be used to refer to
economic actions.' 5 The term "sending" party will refer to the party
imposing the economic sanctions on another. The "target" party is the
intended subject of the economic harm. "Secondary sanctions" are
penalties the sending state imposes on a third party for interaction with
the target nation.
Economic sanctions can take many forms, including: "trade
embargoes; restrictions on particular exports or imports; denial of foreign
assistance, loans, and investments; or control of foreign assets and
economic transactions that involve U.S. citizens or businesses. '1 6
13. See Doyle McManus, Iran Sanctions: Dancing with Tehran, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/201 3 /nov/ 2 7 /opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-iran-sanctions-2
0131127 (stating "In the view of the Obama administration ... the effectiveness of sanctions
brought Iran to the table."); see also White House Office of the Press Secretary, PresidentBarack
Obama's State of the Union Address, WHiTEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address
(stating
"[t]he sanctions that we put in place helped make this opportunity possible."); see also Uri
Berliner, Crippledby Sanctions,Iran'sEconomy Key in Nuclear Deal,NPR.oRG (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/ 2 5/ 2 4 7077050/crippled-by-sanctions-irans-economy-key-in-nuclea
r-deal (stating "[t]here's widespread agreement that sanctions have worked, squeezing Iran
financially and bringing its leaders to the negotiating table.").
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (9th ed. 2009).

15.

Id.

16. Dianne E. Renneck & Robert D. Shuey, CRS Reportfor Congress: Economic Sanctions
to Achieve US. ForeignPolicy Goals: Discussionand Guide to CurrentLaw, CRS FOREIGN AFFS.
& NAT'L DEF. DIVISION (Oct. 20, 1997), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs-sanction.htm.
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Sanctions are imposed for a variety of official goals; they may be
intended to promote human rights, express condemnation, deter
objectionable behavior, isolate a government, or replace a government
entirely. 7
A. The Purposes of Economic Sanctions
In order to justify the imposition of sanctions, they must serve a
legitimate purpose.' 8 The purposes of individual economic sanctions are
rarely clearly stated, and when stated, they are often not the true
purpose. 19 Sanctions are rarely referred to as punishment.20 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 242 states that economic sanctions are not meant to
be punitive in nature. 2 1 Whether or not sanctions are "punishment," they
ultimately impose intended costs on the target nation. 22 The basic
justification behind economic sanctions can be explained through
criminal justice theories: "deterrence (both specific and general),
incapacitation, 23rehabilitation, retribution, and community norm
reinforcement."
Specific deterrence 24 is the imposition of harm on an offender for the
purpose of deterring that same offender from future transgressions. 25 In
the context of economic sanctions, the use of sanctions is intended to
"make[] the cost of misbehaving greater than the benefits." 26 General
deterrence is the imposition of harm on an offender with the intent of
deterring other actors from similar behavior. 27 In the international
context, this includes the use of economic sanctions on a single target
nation to serve as an example to 28the rest of the world, and to discourage
the behavior among other states.
Incapacitation is meant to take away an actor's ability to perform the
offending behavior. 29 A frequent form of incapacitation through
17. Id.
18. Padraic Foran, Why Human Rights Confuse the Sanctions Debate: Towards A GoalSensitive Framework for Evaluating United Nations Security Council Sanctions, 4
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 142 (2009).
19. Id.
20. Id.

21.

Id.; Supplement to an Agenda

for Peace, G.A. Res. 242 (11)

5, U.N.

Doc.A/RES/51/242 (Aug. 12, 2010), availableat http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/viewdoc.asp?
symbol=AIRES/51/242&Lang=E [hereinafter Res. 242].

22.

Foran, supra note 18, at 142.

23.

Id. at 142-43.

24.

Specific deterrence is also known as "special" deterrence.

25.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (9th ed. 2009); Foran, supra note 18, at 144.

26.

Foran, supra note 18, at 144.

27.

Id.; DeterrenceDefinition, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).

28.
29.

Foran, supra note 18, at 144.
Id.
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economic sanctions is the imposition of an arms embargo. This may
remove a state's ability to commit acts of violence by restricting the
30
state's access to weaponry or war related goods.
The main difference between deterrence and rehabilitation is that
"[w]hen deterred, the actor would or might repeat the wrongful behavior
but for the possibility of sanction. When rehabilitated, the actor will not
repeat the wrongful behavior, even absent the possibility of sanction."'"
After economic sanctions are lifted, a rehabilitated target state would
continue to refrain from the offending behavior, not because of the threat
of future sanctions, but to embrace international norms. 3 2 For example, if
economic sanctions were applied to deter human rights violations, the
target state would ideally continue to refrain from such violations after
the removal of sanctions.
The United Nations has denounced the use of economic sanctions for
retributive purposes.3 3 Retribution is harm imposed to punish an offense
that has already been committed.34 Although retributive justice is rarely
invoked as a purpose of economic sanctions, "most political language
surrounding the use of sanctions (whether consciously or not) stresses its
retributive importance. '35 This suggests that retribution through
economic sanctions has popular support, even if it is subliminal.36
Community norm reinforcement is meant to align the target with the
accepted community model.37 Under this theory, punishment often serves
as a symbolic representation of exclusion. 38 "[E]xclusion is a frequent
and perhaps even mandatory incidental output of sanctions aimed at one
of the [above] purposes." 39 A community's decisions about which actors
to include or exclude "define[s] the group's identity and normative
41
values,, 40 and this is the same in the international community.
The United States and its allies have applied the deterrent effect of
economic sanctions on Iran. 42 The U.S. Department of State says that the
reason for imposing sanctions on Iran is to "respon[d] to Iran's continued
30. An arms embargo may also be imposed to incapacitate non-state actors within a nation.
Id. at 144-45.
31. Id.at 144.
32. Id.
33. Res. 242, supra note 21, (I1) 5.
34.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1511 (9th ed. 2009).

35.
36.

Foran, supra note 18, at 145.
Id.

37.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1223 (9th ed. 2009).

38.
39.
40.

Foran, supra note 18, at 146.
Id.
Id.

41.

Id.

42. U.S. Department of State, Iran Sanctions, STATE.GOV, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/
spi/iran/index.htm.
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The United States also claims that it

wants "to persuade Tehran to address the international community's
concerns about its nuclear program," 44 suggesting the need to reinforce
community norms regarding nuclear proliferation. In addition, the United
States and its allies wish to incapacitate and "block the transfer of
weapons, components, technology, and dual-use items to Iran's
prohibited nuclear and missile programs .

. . .,4

However, the actual

effects of the economic sanctions have had broad, punitive effects
extending beyond Iran's nuclear program.46
B. The Legality of Economic Sanctions
The legal channels through which the United States imposes
economic sanctions provide broad discretion and little oversight. The
major international body that promulgates economic sanctions is the U.N.
47 The U.N. Charter does not explicitly include the term
Security Council.
"sanctions., 48 However, the Security Council's authority to impose
economic sanctions can be found throughout several chapters. 49 The U.N.
Charter places the responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security in the Security Council, and it provides the Security Council
broad authority to carry out this responsibility.5 ° The drafters of the U.N.
Charter were concerned that linking the maintenance of peace to
international law could "unduly hinder ' 51 its responsiveness to threats. 2
threats to the peace are not subject
Security Council decisions regarding
53
to any binding judicial review.
The Security Council has the "power to identify threats to the peace
or acts of aggression, and to thereby exercise its jurisdiction . .

.54

Importantly, the Security Council has the "power to take actions short of
military force, including 'complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See infra Part 1II.
47. Robin Geiss, HumanitarianSafeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Callfor
Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring,and Follow-UpAssessment of Long-Term
Effects, 18 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 167, 172 (2005).

48.

Id.

49.
50.
51.

Foran, supra note 18, at 127-28; U.N. Charter ch. V-VII.
Foran, supra note 18, at 127-28; U.N. Charter ch. V, art. 24.
Geiss, supra note 47, at 172.

52.

Id.

53.
54.

Foran, supra note 18, at 127-28; U.N. Charter ch. V.
Foran, supra note 18, at 127-28; U.N. Charter ch. VII, art. 39.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss1/1
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of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."', 5 The
U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution that clarified this power
stating, "[t]he purpose of sanctions is to modify the behavior of a party
that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or
otherwise exact retribution." 56 However, the Resolution provides little
specific guidance, and "the Security Council has taken some creative
",57
paths in defining what constitutes a threat to the peace ....
The United States also uses its own domestic law to impose economic
sanctions. In 1917, the United States enacted the Trading with the Enemy
Act (TWEA).58 This gave the U.S. President "broad authority to
investigate, regulate, prevent or prohibit transactions in times of war or
declared national emergencies." 59 In 1977, Congress enacted the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).60 Under the
IEEPA, the President may exercise economic powers to confront "any
unusual and extraordinary threat

. . .

to the national security, foreign

policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a
national emergency with respect to such threat." 61 In 2001, the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), in
part, increased the executive power "to block transactions
involving
62
property during the pendency of an investigation."
The President's powers under the IEEPA expanded in 2001 when the
U.S. Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act in "response to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks ...."6' The USA PATRIOT Act, in part, increased the
executive power "to block transactions involving property during the
pendency of an investigation." 64 In 2007, Congress passed the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act Enhancement Act

55. Foran, supra note 18, at 127-28 (quoting U.N. Charter ch. VII, art. 41); Geiss, supra
note 47, at 170-71.
56. Geiss, supra note 47, at 171; (quoting Res. 242, supra note 21, (II) 5).
57. Geiss, supra note 47, at 171; Res. 242, supra note 21.
58. Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Validity, Construction, and Operation of International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1707, 183 A.L.R. FED. 57, § 2 (2003);
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 1-39,41-44.
59. Arsdale, supra note 58, § 2.
60. Id.; International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1707; The
InternationalEmergency Economic Powers Act and Related Trade ControlRegulations, 29 No.
2 CoRP. CouNs. Q. art. 4 (2013) [hereinafter JEEPA and Related].
61. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1707.
62. Arsdale, supra note 58, § 2.
63. JEEPA and Related, supra note 60, § I.
64. Arsdale, supra note 58, § 2.
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increasing IEEPA penalties. 65 This increased civil penalties from $50,000
to either $250,000 or twice the violating transaction (whichever is
higher).66 It also raised the criminal penalty for violators of the IEEPA
from $50,000 to $1,000,000.67
Among many challenges, the validity of the IEEPA has been
challenged in court on grounds of violating the freedom of speech
protections of the First Amendment. 68 In addition, it has been challenged
on the grounds of violating the right to due process of law, and protection
from uncompensated takings under the Fifth Amendment.69 It has also
been challenged on the grounds of violating the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable seizures. 70 Though it has received some
negative treatment in court, it has been largely validated and withstood
the challenges. 7 '
The United States began imposing economic sanctions on Iran in 1980
following a crisis in 1979 in which Iranian students took 52 Americans
hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.72 In 1987, the United States
imposed an embargo on Iranian imports. In particular, this prohibited
"dual-use" items from being sold to Iran. 73 In 1997, the United States
prohibited Americans from investing in Iran and expanded trade
restrictions. 74 In 2010, President Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA). This allowed
the United States to impose secondary sanctions on companies and
individuals doing business with Iran, and to prevent companies doing
business with Iran from using American financial institutions.75 The
Security Council has broad discretion under international law to impose
sanctions, and the U.S. President has broad unilateral discretion under
U.S. law. This broad discretion at the national and international levels can
result in extensive economic sanctions that have undesired effects on both
the United States and the targeted country.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

IEEPA and Related, supra note 60, § I.
Id.
Id.
Arsdale, supra note 58, § 2-6.
Id. § 6-15.

70. Id. § 22.
71. Id. §2-25.
72. Steve Jones, A History of U.S. SanctionsAgainst Iran:Newest Round Brings Apparent
Results, ABOUT.COM (May 15, 2013), http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/A-

History-Of-U-S-Sanctions-Against-Iran.htm.
73. Id. Dual-use items are civilian goods that have the potential for military applications.
74.

Jones, supra note 72.

75.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss1/1

8

Watson Wolfe: Nuclear Chain Reaction: Why Economic Sanctions are not Worth the
2015]

NUCLEAR CHAIN REACTION: WHY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE NOT WORTH THE PUBLIC COSTS

9

III. THE PUBLIC COSTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN GENERAL

Despite the enthusiasm of policymakers, economic sanctions
frequently do not achieve their intended goals and have little deterrent
effect. 76 The stance that economic sanctions do not work has "tremendous
support.",77 The purported effectiveness of economic sanctions to achieve
policy goals by non-violent means has "little empirical evidence. 78
When policymakers consider whether to impose a new set of economic
sanctions, they must weigh the potential benefit of achieving their goal
against the historical evidence of ineffectiveness and the public costs
detailed below.
A nuclear explosion is caused by a rapid chain reaction.79 On a basic
level, a nuclear explosion begins with a single submicroscopic neutron
reacting with a single uranium atom. 80 When an extra neutron reacts with
the uranium atom, the neutron is immediately pulled into the uranium
atom. 8 ' This causes the uranium atom to split into two separate atoms,
releasing three extra neutrons and a profusion of energy.8 2 These three
released neutrons then react with other uranium atoms, causing them to
also split and each release three more neutrons and more energy. 83 Each
of those neutrons then splits more uranium atoms and so on. These
particles are so minute that they are undetectable even by microscopes,
yet the totality of the chain reaction causes a catastrophic explosion.
Similarly, the catastrophic costs of economic sanctions are not caused
by a single event. It is the totality of events triggered by an economic
sanction that impose disastrous public costs. However, unlike a nuclear
chain reaction, the economic chain reaction happens slowly over many
years. Because the results take so long to affect the public, the
consequences are often not linked to the imposition of economic
sanctions. The imposition of economic sanctions continues to send
destructive shockwaves throughout the economies of both the sending
and target states long after the initial event.
A. The Public Costs to the UnitedStates as a Sending State
Economic sanctions are a "deliberate infliction of economic self76.

See generally Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, INT'L
66-77 (1998).
77. Foran, supra note 18, at 137.
78. Pape, supra note 76, at 66-67.
79. The Uranium Explosive Myth, HIROSHIMASYNDROME.COM (2014), http://www.
hiroshimasyndrome.com/the-uranium-explosive-myth.htm [hereinafter Uranium].
80. Id. This brief explanation assumes a uranium 235 isotope (U-235).
81. Id.
82. Id. This nuclear fission splits the uranium atom into Barium 141 and Krypton 92.
83. Id.
SECuRITY,
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9

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 1
FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 27

harm . . . ."8 When a sending state imposes economic sanctions, they
often consider it a low-cost coercive or symbolic action. However,
sending economic sanctions has a vast, negative impact on the U.S.
economy. 85 Logically, "the sending State should not enact economic
sanctions if domestic costs are greater than the importance of the policy
objective sought or the likelihood that such objective will be achieved."86
Regrettably, the U.S. government overlooks the chain of events that
creates high domestic costs. When the U.S. government imposes
economic sanctions, American businesses are often forced to bear the
burden.8 7 Every year, "[s]anctions cost U.S. companies billions of dollars
...in lost sales and returns on investment-and cost many thousands of
88
workers their jobs."
When the United States triggers an economic chain reaction by
imposing sanctions, the immediate impact is absorbed by American
businesses that deal directly with the target nation. 89 These businesses
incur the employee and technology costs needed to ensure compliance
with the specific details of the new regulations.9" Furthermore, new
economic sanctions make it impossible for American businesses to
perform their contracts with parties in the target state. 9 ' The negative
effects then begin to spread, impacting other domestic businesses in ways
that are more difficult to quantify; American businesses incur costs from
losing business relationships,
lost opportunities, and the loss of foreign
92
investment opportunities.
States "that frequently coerce [through the use of economic sanctions]
can create a reputation of being unreliable partners." 93 Confusing
regulations deter foreign businesses in third party states from dealing with
American companies.94 When this causes American businesses to lose an
initial sale, American companies then lose the continued business of
95
selling related goods and services throughout the product's time in sale.
84.

Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 155

(2003).
85. Adam Smith, A High Price to Pay: The Costs of the US. Economic Sanctions Policy
and the Needfor Process OrientedReform, 4 UCLA J.INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 325, 338 (2000).

86. Stalls, supra note 84, at 155.
87. Id. at 157.
88.

Richard N. Haass, Policy Brief#34: Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing,

BROOKINGS.EDU 2 (June 1998), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1998/06/sanctionshaass.
89. Joanmarie M. Dowling & Mark P. Popiel, War by Sanctions: Are We Targeting
Ourselves?, 11 WTR CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 8, 9 (2002).
90. Stalls, supra note 84, at 153-54.
91. Id. at 154.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id; Smith, supra note 85, at 338-39.
Stalls, supra note 84, at 154.
Smith, supra note 85, at 338.
Id.at341.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss1/1

10

Watson Wolfe: Nuclear Chain Reaction: Why Economic Sanctions are not Worth the
2015] NUCLEAR CHAIN REACTION: WHY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE NOT WORTH THE PUBLIC COSTS

11

Moreover, American businesses become less competitive because they
are forced to raise prices or make quality concessions 96to make up for the
perceived risk of doing business with a sending state.
As the negative effects of economic sanctions continue to reverberate
throughout the U.S. economy, the "international belief that U.S.
businesses are unreliable trading partners" 97 makes foreign businesses
hesitant to use American-made parts in their products. 98 A foreign
business that incorporates parts built in the United States handicaps itself
if the U.S. government imposes new sanctions that prevent the American
parts manufacturer from completing its supply contracts. 99 Furthermore,
the possibility of economic sanctions allows foreign "companies [to] gain
a commercial advantage over their U.S. counterparts simply by
advertising that they are not subject to the commercial risk that economic
sanctions pose."' 10 Countries that perceive themselves to be under the
threat of economic sanctions will refuse to make agreements with
businesses that incorporate American parts due to the fear of an unreliable
supply. 1 1 This aversion to American business does not apply to goods
alone; the aversion extends to businesses ''that
rely on American
02
companies for "sophisticated support services."
The chain reaction continues to branch throughout the U.S. economy
by making it difficult for domestic companies to obtain export
financing. 10 3 Moreover, raw materials become more expensive.' 0 4 The
effect reaches further into the domestic economy when affected
businesses are forced to eliminate jobs, especially those relating to the
exportation industry.' 0 5 "[E]xport-related jobs ... typically pay a 12/o15% premium over the national wage.6 The displaced workers that
manage to find new employment are often forced to accept jobs at lower
wages. 0 7 Unemployed workers and workers employed at lower wages
8 When consumers have less
lose purchasing power in domestic markets. 10
money to spend domestically, American businesses lose revenue. 109 The
chain reaction exacerbates the difficult job market forcing domestic
96.

Id. at 342.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Stalls, supra note 84, at 156-57.
Id.; Smith, supra note 85, at 341.
Dowling & Popiel, supra note 89, at 10.
Smith, supra note 85, at 341.
Dowling & Popiel, supra note 89, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

106.

Smith, supra note 85, at 343.

107.
108.

Id.
Id.

109.

Id
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I0
businesses to cope with the loss of revenue by eliminating more jobs. 1
Unemployment and lower wages lead to even less purchasing power and
consumer confidence."' The creation of new jobs in the United States is
further limited since foreign companies are deterred from locating
economic sanctions
production facilities in the United States because
2
prevent them from exporting to certain markets."l
In addition to less purchasing power, American consumers face higher
prices for goods.13 When it is more expensive to import raw materials,
the costs of production and manufacturing increase.11 4 These increased
manufacturing costs lead to a more expensive final product.1 5 Economic
sanctions trigger a chain reaction that ultimately leads to the American
16
public having to pay more for goods with less income to spend."

B. The HumanitarianCosts to the Target State's Public
Economic sanctions have been said to be "blunt mechanisms,
analogous to blowing up an entire airplane with innocent passengers on
board to kill just one terrorist."' 17 When the United States imposes
economic sanctions on a target nation, the intent is often to provide an
eventual benefit to the general public after coercing the nation's leaders.
However, the exact opposite frequently occurs. 118 The chain reaction
triggered by the imposition of economic sanctions sends shockwaves
throughout the target nation's economy causing undesired humanitarian
costs. Sanctions are not effective unless they impose costs to the targeted
nation, but the effects on the public of the targeted nation are vast,
extending far beyond the intended harm. Economic sanctions often target
the most vulnerable populations while political leaders and elites are
shielded from the catastrophic conditions."l 9 Even in situations where
humanitarian assistance is exempted, economic sanctions can increase
disease and malnutrition.
Domestic sources of food can be devastated by economic sanctions
because target countries cannot import agricultural essentials such as

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 343-44.
113. Dowling & Popiel, supra note 89, at 12.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Howlett, supra note 6.
118. THE IRAN PROJECT, REPORT: WEIGHING BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 46 (2012) [hereinafter REPORT 2012].
119. Howlett, supra note 6, at 1218.
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seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers. 120 The good intentions of the
international community can worsen problems with attempts to provide
humanitarian aid.' 2 1 When international organizations respond by
delivering food aid, domestic agriculture suffers because farmers cannot
22
compete with the free food brought by international organizations.1
Farmers already lose major sources of income when they are prevented
from exporting their goods. 123 This effect is deepened by farmers losing
the means for economic improvement when they are forced to sell their
livestock or even their farmland to pay expenses. 124 Furthermore, without
fuel, spare parts, and working infrastructure, food supplies can rot in
warehouses while citizens are subjected to starvation. 125 This can trigger
dramatic surges in food expenses caused by the increased demand for the
little food that is available.' 26 Moreover, economic sanctions can decrease
the supply of safe drinking water. 127 Without being able to import the
equipment and chemicals necessary to maintain clean water, the public28is
vulnerable to outbreaks of diseases related to unhygienic conditions. 1
Continuing the chain reaction, economic sanctions also cause the
29
deterioration of health care infrastructure, such as hospitals and clinics. 1
Denying essential medical supplies causes curable and treatable diseases
to become lethal. 130 Under such conditions, performing surgeries
becomes increasingly difficult, and screening for preventable diseases
cannot be carried out adequately.131 Another significant problem arises
when the public of a targeted nation does not have access to legitimate
sources of trade and cannot access the necessary amount of medical
supplies. 3 2 This can create a black market for medical
supplies that is
33
subject to profiteering by illegitimate middlemen.'
The chain reaction caused by economic sanctions can affect multiple
generations. Due to the depressed economy, there is often a decrease in
the quantity and quality of youth education.' 34 Economic sanctions
120.
121.

Smith, supra note 85, at 346-47.
Id. at 352-53.

122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id.at 347.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 347-48. Without safe drinking water for the public, water-borne diseases like
typhoid fever, dysentery, and viral hepatitis increase. These diseases most severely inflict the
elderly.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 348.
Howlett, supra note 6, at 1217.
Smith, supra note 85, at 349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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damage the infrastructure, making it difficult to keep electricity supplied
to schools.' 35 Some families may no longer be able to pay the tuition to
keep their children in school, or they may need to have the children work
to make extra money for the family to live.' 36 Regardless of the reason
to
for which a child leaves school, children are much less likely to return
137
school after they have left, even if the economy is able to recover.
The inability of businesses to import parts or energy for factories
forces businesses to close. This causes jobs to be eliminated, taking the
middle class with them.' 38 When the public has less money to spend, the
domestic effects worsen since businesses and services are forced to shut
down.' 39 This also increases socioeconomic disparities among classes in
the targeted nation's public.' 40 When goods are scarce, prices necessarily
increase. The wealthy are able to pay the prices demanded by the black
market suppliers. 14 1 This demonstrates how economic sanctions severely
damage the lower and middle classes while leaving political leaders and
elites relatively unscathed. 42 What is an inconvenience for the wealthy
can be a matter of life or death for the poor. Economic sanctions may hit
the wealthy in the wallet, but they hit the poor in the stomach.
IV. THE CASE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN
A. The Interim Nuclear Agreement
In late 2013, the P5+1 countries reached a temporary agreement with
Iran regarding Iran's nuclear program. The agreement is renewable by
the consent of all parties with an initial term of six months. 4 3 It was
extended in July 2014.144 The agreement is meant to create a space for all
parties to negotiate for a long term agreement. 45 The agreement makes
clear that it is not intended to be a final agreement; it is intended to be the
first step in reaching a comprehensive, lasting agreement. 146 The
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id.

140.
141.

Id. at351.
Id. at 351-52.

142.
143.

Id. at352.
Interim Agreement, supra note 12, at 1.

144.

Louis Charbonneau & Fredrik Dahl, Iran Warned of 'Last Chance' in Nuclear Talks

After Deadline Missed, REUTERS.COM, July 19, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/19/
us-iran-nuclear-idUSKBNOFN27020140719.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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preamble to the agreement states that the purpose of the agreement is to
reach a comprehensive agreement that
"would ensure Iran's nuclear
147
program will be exclusively peaceful."'
Iran's main responsibilities under the agreement are to halt its current
uranium enrichment activities, and to allow enhanced monitoring of its
nuclear facilities. 148 Specifically, Iran will not enrich uranium beyond
five percent. 49 For the uranium already enriched beyond five percent,
half will be diluted down to five percent. 150 The other half will be used to
fabricate fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. 15'
Iran has agreed that it will not make advancements to its nuclear
facilities while the agreement is in effect.' 52 Iran has also agreed that it
will create no new locations for enrichment. 153 Under the agreement, Iran
was initially obligated to provide detailed information about its nuclear
program within the first three months.154 This included "a description of
each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations
for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on
uranium mines and mills, and information on source material."' 155 Lastly,
Iran will grant international weapons inspectors daily access to its nuclear
facilities, including unannounced inspections. 156
The P5+1 countries have committed to suspending various economic
sanctions, pausing efforts to reduce Iran's oil sales, and allowing Iran to
access some of its oil revenue currently being held abroad. 5 7 The P5+1
countries will not impose any new sanctions as long as the agreement is
in effect.' 58 Furthermore, the agreement states that the countries will work
59
to establish financial channels for humanitarian trade. 1
B. Economic Sanctions are Mistakenly Creditedwith Motivating Iran to
Negotiate
The United States and its allies have claimed that Iran negotiated an
interim agreement because economic sanctions crippled its economy and

147.
148.
149.

Id.
Interim Agreement, supra note 12, at 1-2.
Id. at 1.

150.

Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
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forced Iran to come to the negotiating table. 160 Two members of Congress
wrote that Iran came to the table, "because the economic pain levied on
it by Congress has become unbearable. This outreach was borne out of
necessity, not a sudden gesture of goodwill."' 16 1 Sanctions certainly
played a role in bringing Iran to the table, but Iran's motivation was more
complex.
Another reason that economic sanctions have had little apparent effect
is that Iran's primary negotiation position has not changed in response to
the sanctions.' 6 2 In fact, it has been Iran's perception of change in the
U.S. negotiation position that made the difference. 163 Iran has maintained
64
that it has been willing to agree to a peaceful nuclear program for years. 1
In both 2003 and 2005, Iran made proposals that would limit its nuclear
operations and allow implementation of transparency measures to ensure
that its program was strictly for peaceful purposes only.' 65 In 2003, Iran
issued a proposal to the United States to negotiate several issues.1 66 One
of the items on the proposed agenda was the negotiation of "[flull
transparency over Iran's nuclear program .... " 167 At that time, Iran also
just as it requested in
maintained its right to peaceful nuclear technology,
168
negotiations leading up to the interim agreement.
In 2005, Iran made two separate proposals that also included major
terms on nuclear negotiations.' 69 An Iranian proposal in January 2005
contained "[an Iranian commitment not to pursue weapons of mass
destruction."' 170 In March 2005, Iran made another proposal with the
following terms:
Iran's adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous
on-site inspections at key facilities.
Limiting the expansion of Iran's enrichment program and a policy
declaration of no reprocessing.
Immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods.
160. Robert Menendez & Lindsey 0. Graham, Opinions: Iran's Messenger has Changed.
Its Message has not, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
e3-b75d-5b7f6
irans-messenger-has-changed-its-message-has-not/2013/09/27/bObe5bO4-278e- I1
6349852_story.html.
161.
162.

Id.
Factsheet:History of Official Proposalson the IranianNuclearIssue, ARMS CONTROL

ASS'N (Jan. 2014), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IranNuclearProposals
Proposals Factsheet].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170.
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An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy
for Europe.
Iran's guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology along
with contracts for the construction of nuclear plants in Iran by the
EU.
Normalizing Iran's status under G8 export controls. 171
Iran proposed these terms long before the West's "crippling
sanctions" implemented throughout 2010 and 2013.172 Iran's main
principles have not changed.173 A former top Iranian negotiator stated that
it was not sanctions that brought Iran to the table. 174 He explained that the
main reason that Iran was able to negotiate any deal with the P5+1 was a
change in U.S. policy. 75 The United States had previously insisted that
Iran could not be allowed to enrich uranium. 76 That position changed to
the stance that Iran could not have a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons
program. 177 If the United States truly takes that position, then Iran would
78
have its primary demand-a peaceful nuclear energy program.'
Economic sanctions cannot be solely credited with Iran's willingness to
negotiate in 2013 and 2014 because Iran's primary negotiation demands
remained unchanged.
An internal power shift in Iran was an additional factor leading to
Iran's willingness to negotiate. 179 After a contested, controversial
election in 2009, Iran's leadership was under pressure to restore
legitimacy to the regime.' 80 The Supreme Leader needed a high election
turnout. 181 In order to satisfy both potential revolutionaries and Iran's
conservative leadership, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
allowed strong reformist figures to hold office.1 82 To counteract a planned
boycott, the Supreme Leader allowed moderate politicians, such as the
now-president Hassan Rouhani, to run in the election. 183 Rouhani, a
171.

Id.

172.

Id.

173. Id.
174. Hossein Mousavian, It was not Sanctions that Brought Iran to the Table, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d9631f4-510c-I le3-b499-00144feabdc0.html.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Ariane Tabatabai, Rouhani's Rise and Implications for Iranian Foreign Policy and
Nuclear Politics, MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL (June 24, 2013), http://www.middleeast-arms

control.com/2013/06/2 4 /rouhanis-rise-and-implications-for-iranian-foreign-policy-and-nuclearpolitics/.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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former lawyer and diplomat, was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator from
2003 to 2005.184 During that time Rouhani promoted a "'moderate
approach' as one straying away from all extremism. ' 185 Though Iran's
political system leaves all final decisions to the Supreme Leader, Rouhani
has popular support and approval of Khamenei. 86 Rouhani was able to
influence the negotiations through his appointment of cooperative
diplomats. 187 Rouhani's moderate approach played a88significant role in
Iran's willingness to negotiate an interim agreement. 1
The West's economic sanctions on Iran have been mistakenly credited
with causing Iran's willingness to negotiate. Iran's main negotiating
positions did not changed as a result of sanctions; rather, the change in
Iran's attitude toward communications was primarily caused by Iran's
leadership change.
C. The Economic Costs to the United States Caused by the Imposition of
Economic Sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran
The U.S. sanctions on Iran triggered many detrimental effects to the
United States. The debate over Iran's sanctions caused disputes between
the United States and its allies over the justification of the economic
sanctions. 189 The sanctions also had the reverse effect of the U.S.
objectives in many cases. 190 For instance, the use of economic sanctions
against Iran led to a decrease in Iran's moderate voices.1 91 The sanctions
deteriorating
caused a breakdown in Iran's political infrastructure,
92
accountability, and empowering radical factions.'
Economic sanctions have led to Iran's development of a sophisticated
domestic arms industry.' 9 3 Because Iran's trade relations with the rest of
the world have been uncertain, Iran has spent a large amount of resources
creating and
on developing its own domestic sources of weaponry,
94
stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles internally.'
Another key detriment that the United States brought upon itself
through the use of economic sanctions was that it seriously damaged
relations between Iran and the United States, making it even more

184.
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190.
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difficult to negotiate.' 95 Despite Rouhani's willingness to negotiate with
the United States, there is very little trust between the two nations. 96
Although economic sanctions are meant to cause public discontent
with the target nation's government, Iran's "ultra-conservative factions"
have been able to shift blame by "portray[ing] international sanctions as
U.S.-led 'economic warfare."" 97 Imposing economic sanctions on Iran
has backfired in several ways: hurting the United States and its allies
economically, strengthening Iran's domestic arms industry, and
empowering Iran's radical factions.
Private companies in the in the United States and its allied countries
have been excluded from "potentially lucrative business"' 198 deals with
Iran and Iranian businesses. 199 Iran has the fourth-largest oil reserves in
world.2z0 The sanctions have led to potential conflict in major
international shipping areas, primarily the Strait of Hormuz.2 0 1 Any
economic conflict with Iran inevitably increases oil prices around the
world.20 2 Iran has a GDP20 3 of around one trillion dollars, and has strong
trade ties with the European Union.2 0 4 The United States is still
recuperating from a recession, and the E.U. recovery has been "very
shaky. 20 5 Because the United States and the European Union are still
recovering, avoiding business opportunities to harm Iran can be
especially costly.
D. The HumanitarianCosts to the IranianPublic
The chain reaction caused by the imposition of economic sanctions
has hurt Iran's vulnerable populations. One detrimental result has been
the scarcity of food and other humanitarian necessities.2 0 6 In 2012,
northwestern Iran experienced earthquakes, and economic sanctions
made it difficult for relief groups to reach those in need. 20 7 Even when
195.
196.

Id. at 48.
Id.

197.

THE IRAN PROJECT, REPORT: STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR IRAN: BALANCING PRESSURE

WITH DIPLOMACY 26-27 (2013), available at http://www.crf.org/iran/iran-project-strategicoptions-iran-balancing-pressure-diplomacy/p30487[hereinafter REPORT 2013].
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Id. at27
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Id.at 52

200. This includes only proven oil reserves. REPORT 2012, supra note 118, at 54.
201. Id. at 50. The Strait of Hormuz has been an area of frequent tension, with Iranian Vice
President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi threatening to cut offoil supplies through the Strait.
202.

See id.at 54.

203. This gross domestic product calculation was calculated using Purchasing Power Parity
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204. REPORT 2012,supra note 118, at 52.
205. Id.
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207. Id. at 51.
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they were able to reach those affected by the earthquakes, economic
sanctions made it difficult for relief organizations to receive donations
assistance for
through the Iranian banking system. 20 8 Even government
20 9
the vulnerable has been limited by economic sanctions.
The inability of Iranian citizens to gain access to necessary drugs and
medical supplies has been a humanitarian tragedy.2 10 Due to economic
sanctions, many companies will not export drugs to Iran.2 1 1 In addition to
the direct prohibition of exports, many pharmaceutical companies and
to do so in order
banks that could otherwise do business with Iran refuse
212
countries.
Western
in
reputation
their
risking
to avoid
Iran has a sophisticated domestic drug production industry, and
213
currently manufactures about 90% of its own pharmaceutical needs.
However, this production has become increasingly difficult to maintain
as it has become more difficult to import the necessary active
had difficulty
ingredients. 214 Beyond the pharmaceutical needs, Iran has
215
accessing even basic medical supplies, such as sutures.
Those who are wealthy enough to afford necessary pharmaceuticals
logically stockpile drugs in order to ensure their own supply,
exacerbating the national shortage.21 6 Naturally, as in many other
countries subject to economic sanctions, Iran has developed a flourishing
black market for pharmaceuticals. 2 17 In Iran's black market drug trade,
sellers of pharmaceuticals are able to charge up to four times the price
that drugs would cost in an ordinary market.218 One former Iranian health
official estimates that almost 60% of219Iran's cancer patients are in
jeopardy as a result of the drug shortage.
The imposition of economic sanctions on Iran backfired and caused
many detrimental effects to the United States and its allies. Moreover, it
has caused a humanitarian disaster in Iran. These public costs, weighed
against the miniscule coercive effect, reveal a crumbling justification for
208. Id.
209. See id at 50.
210. See Dara Mohammadi, US-Led Economic Sanctions Strangle Iran's Drug Supply,
LANCET (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www.thelancet.com/joumals/lancet/article/PIIS0 140-6736(13)
60116-6/fulltext.
211. Id.

212.

Id.

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Zahra Baradaran-Seyed, Economic SanctionsStrangleIranians"Health, Not Just Drug
Supply, LANCET (May 11, 2013), http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIS01406736(13)61024-7/fulltext.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Mohammadi, supra note 210.
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the use of economic sanctions.
V. CONCLUSION

Economic sanctions are not worth the public costs. They rarely
achieve their stated goals, and their implementation triggers a destructive
chain reaction that sends shockwaves throughout the sending and target
states. Economic sanctions are imposed to influence the behavior of a
target state through deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
reinforcement of international norms. As seen in Iran, however, the
frequent effect of economic sanctions is retribution: punishing a target
state's public for its leaders' actions.
The legal channels through which the United States imposes
economic sanctions provide alarmingly broad discretion. With other
members of the Security Council, the United States imposes economic
sanctions that are binding on other nations, yet are not subject to binding
judicial review. U.S. law permits the President to unilaterally impose
economic sanctions without specific legislative approval. This broad
discretion at the national and international levels allows the United States
and its allies to create sweeping economic sanctions that endanger the
target nation's public through the denial of basic necessities.
After the signing of the interim nuclear agreement, many American
politicians declared the economic sanctions on Iran a success. However,
that success is illusory. The changes in Iran's position regarding its
nuclear program were mostly inconsequential, and its altered attitude
toward communication was primarily due to its internal leadership
change. Similarly, historical evidence shows that economic sanctions
rarely succeed in bringing about their intended change. The improbable
success of economic sanctions is outweighed by the costs.
Economic sanctions cause intentional "self-harm" 220 to the sending
state. When the United States imposes economic sanctions, the American
public bears a significant burden. Initially, American businesses that deal
directly with the target state suffer. However, the chain reaction spreads,
making American businesses less competitive in international markets.
When American businesses cannot compete, they lose revenue. This
eventually leads to lower domestic wages, higher unemployment, and
more expensive goods. Imposing economic sanctions on Iran has
excluded businesses in the United States and its allies from opportunities
in Iran and international markets. The United States and the European
Union have been recovering from an economic recession, making the
burden of economic sanctions especially costly.
220.

Stalls, supra note 84, at 155.
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The chain reaction triggered by the imposition of economic sanctions
also reverberates throughout the target state's economy, causing
undesired humanitarian damage to the general population. Economic
sanctions can devastate a nation's infrastructure and dramatically
decrease the availability of food and potable water. As seen in Iran, this
can lead to higher rates of malnutrition and disease, while impairing the
function of hospitals and clinics. In addition, economic sanctions on Iran
have inhibited humanitarian response to natural disasters and caused a
national drug shortage. Iran demonstrates the high costs to the well-being
of the targeted nation's public.
The use of economic sanctions against Iran did not demonstrate their
success; rather it has shown that the chain reaction caused by economic
sanctions slowly leads to severe humanitarian costs. Policymakers must
recognize that the illusory benefits from further use of economic
sanctions are not worth the self-inflicted economic burden and the
intolerable denial of humanitarian needs.
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